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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

DANNY LEE JOHNSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 870096
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening Brief at
xi, 1-9.

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to portions of

the Respondent's Brief.

The points to which Appellant does not

reply were adequately covered in his opening brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to establish that
Mr. Johnson intended to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst.
Theft is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement
within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), and the trial court therefore
erred in refusing to suppress Mr. Johnson's misdemeanor theft
convictions.
The trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting
the bloody clothing of Trooper Bringhurst.

The clothing had little

or no probative value which was substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial effect of the bloody clothing.

The trial court erred in admitting positive evidence of
the trooper's character where the defense did not attack the
trooper's character for truthfulness.
Attempted homicide is not a triggering offense under the
habitual criminal statute.

The attempt merely classifies the

offense, and the court must look to the underlying substantive
offense in determining whether the legislature intended to exempt
attempted murder.

ARGUMENT

I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
As the State noted in its brief at 20, in State v.
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court stated:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
Mr. Johnson contends that the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst, when
read in conjunction with the physical evidence and the testimony of
Officer Evans, was so inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Johnson committed
the crime for which he was charged.
In its brief, the State characterizes the initial actions
of Mr. Johnson as "almost inviting the patrolman to stop him."
Respondent's Brief at 21. Contrary to counsel's depiction of the
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actions as an invitation, Trooper Bringhurst's testimony was that
the driving pattern coupled with the affirmation by the driver that
he had been drinking suggested that the driver of the vehicle was
drunk (T. 70-71).

The physical evidence showing a .203 blood

alcohol level confirmed the trooper's belief (T. 568). Furthermore,
by the State's reasoning, Mr. Johnson was in a no-win situation in
answering the trooper's question.

An honest affirmative response is

characterized as an attempt to lure the officer; counsel may well
have characterized a negative response as an attempt to delay the
stop and lure the trooper to a more secluded spot further from the
city.
Finally, although the State contends Mr. Johnson lured
the trooper to the Paxton Avenue location (Respondent's Brief at
21), the trooper was explicit about the number of lights in the area
and the fact that it was well lit (T. 73-4).
As Mr. Johnson outlined in his opening Brief, the
critical seconds in this case began when the trooper approached
Mr. Johnson's car and ended after the trooper fired his last shot.
Of utmost importance in determining what occurred during this time
frame is the testimony of Officer Evans, who heard all six shots
fired and arrived on the scene and was able to see the trooper after
three shots had been fired.

Officer Evans, although much closer to

the scene than the other officers who testified they heard a "boom"
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then five "pops" was unable to distinguish between the shots1
(T. 253). Furthermore, Officer Evans testified that Trooper
Bringhurst was still standing when he arrived and was able to view
the scene and only went down after the third shot (T. 254-5).

The

testimony of Richard Bergan, a weapon's expert, established that the
impact of the shot gun blast would have knocked the trooper to the
ground (T. 447, 438-9, 445-6).

This information coupled with

Officer Evans' observations suggests that the shot gun blast was the
shot fired right before the trooper went down, or the third shot in
the six-shot sequence.
The State speculates that "after he threw himself
backward to avoid the blast, Trooper Bringhurst attempted to get to
his feet but because he was unsteady, he fell to the ground.
Officer Evans saw him on his feet as he was falling to the ground in
one motion."

Respondent's Brief at 24. Such speculation is not

based on anything in the record (see T. 224-5) and Trooper
Bringhurst did not testify that he attempted to get back up.
Furthermore, the rapid sequence of firing did not allow time for
such a scenario.
The State concedes that the door of the vehicle was "open
for at least three of the five shots."

Respondents Brief at 23.

The State claims that the trooper "was unable to see whether the
door was open or closed" and "did not know that the door had been
opened."

Resondent's Brief at 22. The trooper's exact testimony

1

Sgt. Vaughn testified that he and Sgt. Ferrin may have
been talking when the first shot was fired (T. 296).
- 4
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regarding whether the door was opened is as follows:
Q.

During this time that you have just described
that the shots were fired, could you see
whether the defendant had his car door open at
any time?

A.

He didn't have the car door open. As I
approached, it was not even cracked, and when
I fired my last shot, the car door was not
opened.

(R. 1435).

The trooper exhibited no hesitation in testifying that

the door was not open.

The State's attempt to label Appellant's

statement that Trooper Bringhurst testified that "the door was
closed throughout the incident" as a misstatement of the facts
(Respondent's Brief at 23) and further attempt to construe the
trooper's testimony as being that he did not know whether the door
was open does not change the unequivocal statement of the trooper
that the door was not open during the incident, that it was not open
at the beginning of the shooting nor several seconds later when the
shooting stopped.
The position of the door and the trooper's perception of
it is important since, as the State acknowledges, the door had to be
open for the bullets to have ended up where they were found.

Yet

only Mr. Johnson testified to the open door; the trooper's inability
to perceive the position of the door casts serious question on his
ability to perceive the other incidents which occurred during those
few seconds.
As set forth further in Appellant's opening Brief, the
testimony of Trooper Bringhurst was so inherently improbable that
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Johnson intended to kill the trooper.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
MR. JOHNSON'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
In its brief, the State acknowledges that "the majority
of federal courts have ruled that theft is not a crime of
dishonesty."

Respondent's Brief at 38.

In State v. Wight,

No. 870558-CA, slip op. (Utah App. December 1, 1988), the Utah Court
of Appeals echoed the majority view, stating ". . .we agree with
[United States v.] Lipscomb[,702 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1983)] that
the crime of robbery is not necessarily one of dishonesty or false
statement for purpose of 609(a)(2) admissibility."

Ij3. at 9.

The

Wight court pointed out, however, that "under 609(a)(2) inquiry may
be made, at the court's discretion, regarding the particular facts
to determine if honesty was a factor."

_Id.

In Wight, where the

trial court made no such inquiry, the Court of Appeals held that the
robbery conviction was inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2).
The State relies on the decision of the Washington
Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 43 Crim. Law Rep. (BNA) 2315 (Wash.
July 14, 1988) for support of its argument that theft is not a crime
of dishonesty within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).

However, the

Washington court expressly pointed out that it was rejecting federal
interpretation of the rule.

It stated:

Rather than concentrating on federal
interpretation of the federal rule, we will
examine the meaning of ER 609(a)(2) without using
federal case law and federal legislative history
as a starting point.
- 6
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Unlike the Washington court, this Court has expressed an
intention to seek uniformity between federal and Utah State rules of
evidence by looking to the federal rules and decisions interpreting
them for guidance.

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-4 (Utah

1986) (citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986));
Preliminary Note, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).
Furthermore, the Brown court acknowledged that the
majority federal position is that theft crimes are not crimes of
dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).
State v. Burton, 676 P.2d 975, 981 (Wash. 1984).
Mr. Johnson urges that this Court follow the majority and
"better reasoned" decisions under Rule 609(a)(2) (State v.
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, J., dissenting at
222 n.2) and find that theft crimes are not crimes of dishonesty or
false statement within the meaning of that rule.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
BLOODY CLOTHING OF TROOPER BRINGHURST.
The State contends that the bloody clothing was necessary
to establish that Mr. Johnson was aware that Trooper Bringhurst was
a law enforcement officer at the time of the incident and that the
shirt therefore was relevant. Respondent's Brief at 45. Although
counsel speculates that a possible defense in the instant case was
"that defendant did not know Bringhurst was a law enforcement
officer" (Respondent's Brief at 45), such a defense could easily
have been countered by the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst that he
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was in a uniform in a marked police car (T. 56-57f 73) or the
testimony of other officers that the trooper was in uniform
(T. 224-5, 294-5).

Furthermore, counsel's speculation is

ill-founded since that was not a defense raised in this case and
nothing about the case suggested it might be.2

Because the evidence

was cumulative of the extensive testimony establishing that Trooper
Bringhurst was in uniform, and for the reasons outlined in
Appellant's opening brief at 33, it had minimal probative value.
The State further contends that "as compared to the
gruesome photographs of victim's bodies [sic], a shirt with dried
blood stains on the shoulder is not likely to incite passion or
inflame the emotions of a jury."

Respondent's Brief at 46. On the

contrary, while gruesome photographs carry their own potential to
inflame a jury, a bloody shirt is more tactile and the reality of
the crime and its impact on the victim is more jarring and not as
removed as is the case with a photograph.

Opening an old grocery

bag which contains a uniform shirt covered with dried blood and
examining that shirt raises the same or greater revulsion and
sympathy for the victim in jurors as examining a gruesome
photograph.

The prejudicial effect evinced by that revulsion and

sympathy and the concomitant concern for the trooper far outweighed
any minimal probative value of the evidence.

2

Had such a defense been raised, the State would have
had an opportunity to counter it in rebuttal.
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VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ALLOWING POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF TROOPER
BRINGHURST'S CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS,
In its brief at 62, Respondent states:
If Trooper Bringhurst truly could not recall what
occurred, he would consequently be a witness who
was not credible. Some statements, while taken
out of context, were definitely inconsistent. His
character for truthfulness had been attacked and,
therefore, his credibility had been attacked
within the meaning of the rule.
Such circular reasoning by the State does change the fact that the
defense did not attack Trooper Bringhurst's character for
truthfulness; instead, it challenged his ability to recall the
details of the incident and, hence, the reliability of his testimony.
Credibility is comprised of two aspects:

(a) the

reliability of the testimony based on the witness1 ability to
perceive and recall the incident and (b) the witness1 truthfulness.
A completely honest person, where there is no question as to his
character for truthfulness, can nevertheless deliver testimony that
is not credible because he did not have the opportunity to see the
event or cannot remember the details.

In almost every criminal

case, an "attack" is made on the witness1 ability to perceive and
recall details, either through cross-examination or the use of prior
inconsistent statements by the witness.
The second aspect of credibility, the witness1 character
for truthfulness, is not attacked as often in criminal cases.
However, in cases where the witness is known to lie or is caught in
an untruth, a challenge to the witness1 truthfulness is made. In
its brief, the State blurs the distinction between the two aspects
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of credibility and argues that where an attack is made on the
reliability of the testimony, the truthfulness of a witness is
automatically attacked, thereby allowing for positive evidence of
truthfulness under Rule 608(a)(2).

However, under 608(a)(2), the

rule-making body expressly clarified that "the character of the
witness for truthfulness" must be attacked, not that the credibility
in general of the witness must be attacked, before evidence of
truthful character is admissible.
As the Appellant attempted to point out in his opening
brief, the use of prior inconsistent statements in the instant case,
while an attempt to show that Bringhurst had difficulty remembering
details of the incidents and the details of his testimony were
therefore not reliable, did not attack Bringhurst's character for
truthfulness.

See Appellant's opening brief at 56-7.

While it is true that "[a] basic rule of evidence
provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach
the credibility of a witness" [see Respondent's Brief at 63,
3eard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 503 (7th Cir. 1979), citing United
States v. Hall, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)], prior inconsistent statements
do not necessarily attack the character of a witness for
truthfulness.

in the instant case, the trooper's character for

truthfulness was not attacked by the defendant's use of his prior
statement; rather, the trooper's ability to perceive and recall were
challenged, as is the case in almost every criminal trial.

Allowing

evidence of the trooper's character for truthfulness, where such
character was not attacked by the defense, improperly bolstered the
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State's case, resulting in prejudice to Mr. Johnson.

IX. ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE IS NOT A TRIGGERING
OFFENSE UNDER THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE.
In order to convict a defendant of "Attempted Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree," the State must establish that
the defendant violated Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1953 as amended),
the first degree murder statute and the attempt provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended).

In charging Mr. Johnson in

the instant case, the State outlined Count I in the Information as
follows:
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE FIRST
DEGREE, a First Degree Felony, at 300 West Paxton
Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or
about May 27, 1986, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 202(k), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DANNY LEE
JOHNSON, a party to the offense, intentionally or
knowingly attempted to cause the death of Dennis
Bringhurst and that at the time of the attempted
homicide the victim was or had been a peace
officer or law enforcement officer, and he was
either on duty or the homicide was based on,
caused by, or was related to that official
position and the act or knew or reasonably should
have known that the victim held or had had
facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance
Of the ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, as provided by

Section 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
In its Information, the State focused on the murder statute,
classifying it at the end as an attempt rather than a successful
murder.

However, a review of the Information and the elements

necessary for proof establish that the "offense" charged in this
case is Murder.
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The State points out that the legislative history of the
statute is unclear as to why the language exempting Murder in the
first or second degree was included in the statute in 1896 or
retained when the statute was revised in 1953 and reenacted in
1975.

Respondent's Brief at 77. Although counsel attempts to

delete and limit the statute by asserting that it serves no purpose
(Respondent's Brief at 77), the language has repeatedly been
included, even in modern times.
3ecause the underlying offense for which Mr. Johnson was
charged is Murder, the trial court erred in allowing that underlying
offense, as qualified by the attempt classification, to operate as a
triggering offense under the Habitual Criminal statute.

The

conviction for Being an Habitual Criminal should therefore be
reversed and the case remanded for dismissal of that charge.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial or dismissal of
the charges.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1988.

X J. REMAL
/ /
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

^M-e.cdaU
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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